Publication Date: 2014

Publication Name: The Mariner's Mirror

Publication Date: 2015

Publication Name: The Mariner's Mirror

Publication Date: 2015

Publication Name: Journal for Maritime Research

During the Russo-Japanese War British naval attachés serving with the Japanese produced a series of reports on both technical and cultural aspects of the conflict. In seeking to explain the Japanese successes the atta... more abstractDuring the Russo-Japanese War British naval attachés serving with the Japanese produced a series of reports on both technical and cultural aspects of the conflict. In seeking to explain the Japanese successes the attachés compared and contrasted their hosts with themselves, Royal Navy, and Britain more generally. These reports offer a rare insight in the cultural preconceptions of Royal Navy officers prior to the First World War, presenting explicitly the norms and beliefs that served to unite the service. Recovering these collective understandings helps to illuminate the decision making processes that took place within the Royal Navy both prior to and during the First World War.

Publication Date: Mar 30, 2016

Publication Name: War and Society

Naval power projection operations were an important tool in Victorian Britain’s strategic arsenal. From the 1860s technological change in the form of mines presented a major threat to the Royal Navy’s strategy of coas... more abstractNaval power projection operations were an important tool in Victorian Britain’s strategic arsenal. From the 1860s technological change in the form of mines presented a major threat to the Royal Navy’s strategy of coastal assault. In order to continue to operate in this environment the Royal Navy proactively engaged with mining technology. Through this process it shaped the new technology to suits its particular strategic and cultural requirements. The war scares with Russia in 1878 and 1885 provided the impetus to operationalise these developments and highlighted how the Royal Navy and its coastal assault strategy remained an important facilitator of British policy.

Publication Name: Journal of Military History

This article shows how Sir John Fisher, together with Edward VII sought to use Britain’s naval strength as a tool of deterrence against Germany. By highlighting the Royal Navy’s strength, and German vulnerability they... more abstractThis article shows how Sir John Fisher, together with Edward VII sought to use Britain’s naval strength as a tool of deterrence against Germany. By highlighting the Royal Navy’s strength, and German vulnerability they tried to convince policy makers in Berlin that war was not in German interests. This attitude underpinned much of Fisher’s naval policy and helps to explain some of his more extreme statements and actions, which have been the source of certain contradictions within the current historiography.

More Info: http://wih.sagepub.com/content/22/2/155.full.pdf+html

Publication Name: War in History April 2015

This article shows how the Royal Navy under the leadership of John Fisher exploited the British Consular system in Germany and Denmark to obtain both open source and covert intelligence between 1906 and 1914. This str... more abstractThis article shows how the Royal Navy under the leadership of John Fisher exploited the British Consular system in Germany and Denmark to obtain both open source and covert intelligence between 1906 and 1914. This structure was initially constructed with the tacit support of the Foreign Office, replacing an earlier intelligence network in France and Russia. The intelligence collected by the consuls reflected the Royal Navy’s strategic priorities at the time. The most important subject concerned German coastal defences, a detailed knowledge of which was essential for the Admiralty’s offensive littoral strategy. From 1908 Charles Hardinge attempted to restrict the Admiralty’s use of its Consular Officers for intelligence purposes, with limited success. The consuls continued to provide essential intelligence for the Royal Navy up until the outbreak of war.

More Info: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/kuKj3usGsUbyvZE9rUAC/full

Publication Date: Jul 30, 2014

Publication Name: International History Review

During the First Moroccan Crisis relations between the War Office and the Admiralty deteriorated to such an extent as to prevent any further steps being taken with regard to combined planning for a war against Germany... more abstractDuring the First Moroccan Crisis relations between the War Office and the Admiralty deteriorated to such an extent as to prevent any further steps being taken with regard to combined planning for a war against Germany. In 1907 this process was begun again on a small scale, involving middle-ranking officers and referring to a potential operation in Denmark in order to maintain access to the Baltic. This process never reached its dénouement, unsurprisingly being drawn into the political battles being fought by the senior officers in the CID for strategic primacy and ultimately funding. It does, however shed light on the potential for such a dialogue removed from the personal and institutional rivalries that dominated grand strategy in this period. The evidence left by these discussions also suggest that the Admiralty and the War Office were far more flexible in their strategic outlook than they suggested to the CID. Ultimately it reveals the complete failure of government by committee and the extent to which the CID weakened and distorted British defence policy in the lead up to the First World War.

Publication Date: May 2013

Publication Name: Mars & Clio

The role of Edward VII in British foreign policy has been largely overlooked in much of the recent historiography. The focus on the Departments of State and the Westminster Government has meant that the existence of a... more abstractThe role of Edward VII in British foreign policy has been largely overlooked in much of the recent historiography. The focus on the Departments of State and the Westminster Government has meant that the existence of an independent and differentiated foreign policy emanating from Windsor has been ignored. One of the most important tools Edward used to drive a particular agenda was the Royal Navy. In an era when navalism was at its height the Royal Navy was a flexible instrument, which could act as a symbol of support or of deterrence; and one which universally demonstrated the power and influence of Great Britain. From the beginning of his reign there had been opposition from within the Foreign Office to what was perceived as Royal meddling. The use of the fleet in diplomacy enabled the King to modify British foreign policy whilst staying nominally apart from the affairs of state. This tool can be seen to play a role in the many of the key foreign policy developments of Edward’s reign, from the restoration of relations with France, through the Moroccan Crisis to the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907.

Location: King's College London

Event Date: May 27, 2014

Organization: Monarchies at War Conference

Following the disastrous conduct of the Boer War, Army reform and defence economy were two of the most important tasks facing Arthur Balfour’s Unionist Government. In an effort to achieve these goals Balfour looked to... more abstractFollowing the disastrous conduct of the Boer War, Army reform and defence economy were two of the most important tasks facing Arthur Balfour’s Unionist Government. In an effort to achieve these goals Balfour looked to re-evaluate the role of the Army, including in home defence. This process took the form of the invasion debates in the Committee of Imperial Defence which lasted between 1903 and 1905. Balfour’s aim was to ascertain what was the minimum size of force necessary to protect the British Isles against invasion. Neither the Army nor the Navy saw the issue in such straightforward terms. These debates quickly developed into something far more important, a tussle between the services for primacy in British defence policy. In an era of increasing defence economy this was seen as crucial, by both sides, for securing sufficient funding. As a result both sides were willing to go to extraordinary lengths, including deception, to achieve their aims. A combination of Army intransigence, a change of Government, and the shift in strategic priorities after 1905 meant that the debates did not have the immediate impacted anticipated. The way in which they were conducted did, however, signal a breakdown in the relationship between the Army, the Navy and the political institutions supposed to manage the services. In particular the relationships between key figures such as Admiral Sir John Fisher and General Sir William Nicholson were damaged beyond repair. The results would be felt throughout the pre-war period, attempts to develop a coherent combined defence policy were constantly undermined by mistrust and ill feeling originating in the invasion debates. This was one of the main reasons why in 1914 Britain lacked clear strategic direction and embarked on a conflict without a definite sense of policy or purpose.

Location: QMUL

Event Date: Nov 2013

Organization: Empire in Peril Conference

Location: Senate House

Event Date: Dec 10, 2013

Organization: Institute of Historical Research

The Russo-Japanese War was the first conflict between major naval powers for half a century, a period of time that had seen a revolution in naval matériel. Military organisations from across the globe rushed observers... more abstractThe Russo-Japanese War was the first conflict between major naval powers for half a century, a period of time that had seen a revolution in naval matériel. Military organisations from across the globe rushed observers out to the conflict zone in order to try and learn the lessons of this modern war. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance helped give Royal Navy officers largely unfettered access to the Japanese fleet even in battle. The reports sent back by these attachés were to play an important role in the development of naval policy, but they also offer an insight into the complex relationship between the two nations and their navy’s. The natural tendency of the attachés to associate with their hosts and project a “Britishness” onto them was undermined by the obvious racial and cultural differences. The fact that the British were allied to the Asian power fighting a largely European one set up some challenging moral questions for officers of a broadly conservative organisation. Furthermore the attachés’ situation, being there principally to learn from the Japanese represented a strange inversion of previous affairs, and what was considered the proper order of things. In all the reports of the attachés offer not only a treasure trove of technical information and a clear view of how the British perceived their allies, but also reveal a great deal about how the officers of the Royal Navy perceived themselves, their Service and their nation.

Location: National Maritime Museum, Greenwich

Event Date: Jul 27, 2013

Organization: Navy and Nation Conference

The Royal Navy had long viewed coastal assault as an essential aspect of its strategy and an effective lever of British influence on continental powers such as Russia, France or the United States. The development of r... more abstractThe Royal Navy had long viewed coastal assault as an essential aspect of its strategy and an effective lever of British influence on continental powers such as Russia, France or the United States. The development of realistic underwater weapons in the form of mines and early torpedoes from the 1860s threatened to undermine this strategy. This paper seeks to explain how the Royal Navy sought to adopt and adapt controlled mining technology, that is the manual firing of explosives by electricity, to counter this threat. This technology took on a dual role within the Royal Navy being used for the protection of advanced anchorages and the clearance of enemy minefields. These developments were at the cutting edge of the second industrial revolution, applying advanced chemical and electrical engineering to a submarine setting. It was not always successful; efforts were hampered by the limits of technology and finance. It is clear however, that by 1878 the British were in a position to utilize controlled mining technology in an offensive coastal assault strategy. The Straits Crisis led the Navy to mobilize a fleet for the Baltic, whose purpose was to project British power ashore. Potential targets included Revel, Cronstadt and eventually St Petersburg. The Crisis was resolved without the requirement for such action, but the threat remained. The developments in mining technology and skills were crucial in maintaining the British ability to strike anywhere within ‘cannon shot of deep water’; a vital and frequently underestimated tool in nineteenth century foreign policy.

Organization: British Commission for Military History

Conference End Date: Nov 2011

Conference Start Date: Nov 2011

Event Date: Jan 2013

Organization: King's Maritime History Seminars

In 1867 Robert Whitehead, an expatriate British engineer working in Austria-Hungary wrote to the Admiralty offering to sell them the rights to his radical new locomotive torpedo. In 1871 after extensive trials the Nav... more abstractIn 1867 Robert Whitehead, an expatriate British engineer working in Austria-Hungary wrote to the Admiralty offering to sell them the rights to his radical new locomotive torpedo. In 1871 after extensive trials the Navy purchased a license to build and use Whitehead torpedoes, with the Director of Naval Ordnance, Astley Cooper-Key viewing the weapon as ‘one of the very highest importance to any maritime power’. Having bought the torpedo the Royal Navy struggled over the next 30 years to fully institutionalise it. Difficulties over how and where to deploy the torpedo and what was the most suitable platform to operate it from all played their role it this process. At its heart, however was the problem that the weapon did not fit easily with the Service’s strategic outlook. The power of submarine explosions to sink ships was not in dispute, but questions as to their suitability for a Navy seeking to command the sea remained stubbornly difficult to answer. This paper aims to explore the relationship between strategy and dissonant technology within an advanced military organisation. The nineteenth century Royal Navy was a technologically progressive service, with very clear ideas as to its strategic aims. The Service’s relationship with the Whitehead torpedo does however go some way to expose the problems produced by trying to institutionalise a technology which tends to operate on different strategic principles to those embodied by the organisation.

Publication Date: Nov 2013

Publication Name: A Military Transformed: Adaptation and Transformation in the British Military 1792-1945